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Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing portfolio value when an agent has a subjective view on asset
value which differs from the traded market price. The agent’s trades will have a price impact which affect
the price at which the asset is traded. In addition to the agent’s trades affecting the market price, the
agent may change his view on the asset’s value if its difference from the market price persists. We also
consider a situation of several agents interacting and trading simultaneously when they have a subjective
view on the asset value. Two cases of the subjective views of agents are considered, one in which they
all share the same information, and one in which they all have an individual signal correlated with
price innovations. To study the large agent problem we take a mean-field game approach which remains
tractable. After classifying the mean-field equilibrium we compute the cross-sectional distribution of
agents’ inventories and the dependence of price distribution on the amount of shared information among
the agents.
1 Introduction
A significant proportion of trading performed in modern markets is done by computer algorithms with
some reports giving figures of up to 80% of trades in some markets (see Kaya et al. (2016) and Bigiotti and
Navarra (2018)). Many of these algorithms are used to execute strategies that manage inventory, for example
to rebalance a portfolio or achieve a desired hedge ratio. Others may also be speculative, executing trades
based on predictions of market behaviour. When a trading strategy is designed based on speculation, trade
executions are typically based on a trade signal, which indicates that the value of the asset at a future time
will be predictably different from its present value. Exploiting this predicted difference offers the possibility
of attaining a profit.
The trade executions which are conducted in a market will also have impact on the dynamics of the
market itself, and when several market participants implement trading strategies simultaneously they will
inevitably influence the behaviour of each other. Thus, in order for a strategy to be designed to perform
executions in an optimal manner, the trade signals of other market participants should also be taken into
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account. The analysis of such a system quickly leads to a high dimensional problem, but framing the system
in terms of a mean-field game allows for further tractability.
In this work, we consider how an agent will base his trades through time on an observed trade signal.
In general, a trade signal can be an abstract quantity which dictates tendencies of market dynamics as
in Donnelly and Gan (2018), or it can be treated as a direct valuation adjustment of the asset compared
to the prevailing midprice as in Lehalle and Mounjid (2017). We take the latter approach in that the
agent’s trade signal is directly transformed into a monetary quantity to be added to the asset price to give
a subjective valuation. The agent also controls his trading to manage the risk of his position at the end of
the trading horizon as an acknowledgement that his assessment of value may not be accurate. This single
agent framework is structured similar to Almgren and Chriss (2001) with the addition of the observed trade
signal. Beyond the single agent problem we investigate a market in which several agents are trading, each of
whom is observing a trade signal that dictates their subjective valuation of the asset. In this setting, in order
to fully optimize the profits they seek to extract from their trade signal, the agents must take into account
the aggregate behaviour of other market participants. In order to maintain tractability of the model when
there are a large number of agents, we use a mean-field game approach. Similar approaches with respect to
optimal execution and algorithmic trading are conducted in Huang et al. (2015) and Casgrain and Jaimungal
(2018b).
Additionally, the work Casgrain and Jaimungal (2018a) also considers a mean-field approach where
subsets of agents have different views of the asset price. While in that work the differing beliefs are modeled
as agents behaving according to different probability measures, we work with a fixed probability where each
agent observes a different trade signal process which forms their subjective valuation. We consider two
specifications of how the trade signals of different agents relate to each other. First, we suppose that they
all share the same trade signal which is correlated with the asset’s midprice. Then any differences in their
trading behaviour will come from different initial inventories. Second, we suppose that they all have different
trade signals, each correlated with the asset’s midprice with a structure that also dictates the nature of the
correlation between any pair of signals. In the second case, if all correlations are equal to 1 and the initial
signal states are identical across all agents, then the model reverts to the first case of the shared signal.
In order for each agent to optimize their trades they must take into account the order flow submitted by
other agents. This is similar to models proposed in Cartea and Jaimungal (2016a) and Cartea and Jaimungal
(2016b) in which net order flow is given by an exogenous process. In this work, agents make an assumption
about the net order flow process before conducting their individual optimization. A mean-field equilibrium is
reached by finding a fixed point of the net order flow process. If all agents trade according to the mean-field
equilibrium, then we can quantify the relationship between the correlation of their trade signals and the
cross sectional distribution of their inventories through time. This also allows us to study how the overall
price impact on the asset depends on how much information is shared between agents as dictated by the
correlation between their signals.
In Section 2 we propose our model of a single agent optimizing trades with the observation of a trade
signal and analyze the agent’s optimal trading strategy. In Section 3.1 we propose our model when there are
several agents trading simultaneously. The section is broken down into subsections depending on whether
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the agents share the same signal (Section 3.2) or have separate but correlated signals (Section 3.3). In
Section 4 we compute the cross-sectional joint distribution of the inventory and trade signal across all agents
and show how this depends on the correlation of the trade signals. We also compute how this correlation
affects the variance of the asset price. We conclude in Section 5.
2 One Agent
2.1 Model without interaction
In this section, we consider a single agent that wishes to maximize the value of a portfolio at a future time
T <∞ through trading a single risky asset with temporary and permanent price impact. The agent has his
own subjective valuation of the asset which may be different from the market price. At each point in time
the agent chooses a rate at which he buys shares of the asset via a process ν = (νt )0≤t≤T. Thus, denoting
the agent’s inventory holdings by Qν = (Qνt )0≤t≤T, it changes according to
dQνt = νtdt , Q
ν
0 = Q0 .
The market view of asset value is denoted Sν = (Sνt )0≤t≤T, which will be subject to a permanent price
impact due to the agent’s trades. We model permanent price impact through a linear relation and thus the
market view of the asset satisfies
dSνt = (µ+ bνt )dt + σdWt , S
ν
0 = S0 ,
where W = (Wt )0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion. Temporary price impact is also accounted for by modeling
the price of trades as being dependent on the speed of trading. Given that the speed of trading at time t is
νt , the price at which the transaction occurs is
Ŝ
ν
t = S
ν
t + kνt .
Thus, the agent’s cash process, denoted Xν = (Xνt )0≤t≤T satisfies
dXνt = –Ŝ
ν
t νtdt , X
ν
0 = X0 .
We suppose that the agent observes a trade signal which means his own subjective view of the asset’s value
differs from the traded market price Sν . We will denote the difference between the subjective value and the
traded market price by Vν = (Vνt )0≤t≤T, which satisfies
dVνt = –(βV
ν
t + γνt )dt + ηdZt , V
ν
0 = V0 ,
where Z = (Zt )0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion correlated with W with constant correlation parameter ρ. At
time t when the market price of the asset is Sνt , the agent’s subjective valuation of the asset due to the trade
signal is Sνt + V
ν
t . Even though V
ν
t represents a valuation adjustment due to the trade signal, we will refer
to the process Vν as the trade signal. The dynamics of Vν imply that the trade signal is influenced by the
trading of the agent, this coming from the term –γνt . This is to capture the effect of diminishing the trade
signal’s strength when the agent acts upon the information that it provides.
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2.2 Agent’s Objective Functional and HJB Equation
Throughout the remainder of Section 2 we work with a complete and filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft )0≤t≤T,P)
where (Ft )0≤t≤T is the standard augmentation of the natural filtration generated by (Wt , Zt )0≤t≤T and
(S0, Q0, X0, V0). We suppose the agent wishes to maximize the following functional of ν:
J(ν) := E
(
XνT +Q
ν
T(S
ν
T +V
ν
T) – α(Q
ν
T)
2
)
,
where the control process ν must be taken from the admissible set N which consists of F-predictable
processes such that E[
∫ T
0 ν
2
t dt ] < ∞. The first term in the expectation XνT is the amount of cash on hand
at time T. The second term in the expectation QνT(S
ν
T + V
ν
T) is the agent’s assessment of the value of his
inventory holdings at time T. The third term –α(QνT)
2 behaves as a risk control term and is present because
the agent acknowledges that his valuation due to the trade signal may not be completely accurate. This
term helps to ensure that he does not acquire very large inventory positions due to the the risk of being
incorrect. Let us define the agent’s value function H as follows
H(t , x , q , S, V) := sup
ν∈N
Et ,x ,q ,S,V
(
XνT +Q
ν
T(S
ν
T +V
ν
T) – α(Q
ν
T)
2
)
.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation (PDE) associated with H is
∂tH+ sup
ν∈R
(AνH) = 0, H(T, x , q , S, V) = x + q(S + V) – αq2, (2.1)
where the operator Aν is given by
Aν = –(S + kν)ν∂x + ν∂q + (µ+ bν)∂S – (βV + γν)∂V +
1
2
σ2∂SS +
1
2
η2∂VV + ρση∂SV .
2.3 Solving the HJB PDE
In this section, we express the solution to the HJB PDE (2.1) in terms of a system of coupled ODEs.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose c1, . . . , c6 : [0, T] → R satisfy the following system of ODEs with terminal
conditions:
c ′1 + η2c5 +
(c2 – γc3)2
4k
= 0 , c1(T) = 0 ,
c ′2 + µ+
(c2 – γc3)(b + 2c4 – γc6)
2k
= 0 , c2(T) = 0 , (2.2)
c ′3 – βc3 +
(c2 – γc3)(c6 – 2γc5)
2k
= 0 , c3(T) = 0 , (2.3)
c ′4 +
(b + 2c4 – γc6)2
4k
= 0 , c4(T) = –α ,
c ′5 – 2βc5 +
(c6 – 2γc5)2
4k
= 0 , c5(T) = 0 ,
c ′6 – βc6 +
(c6 – 2γc5)(b + 2c4 – γc6)
2k
= 0 , c6(T) = 1 .
Then the value function H is given by
H(t , x , q , S, V) = x + qS + h(t , q , V) ,
4
h(t , q , V) = c1(t) + c2(t)q + c3(t)y + c4(t)q2 + c5(t)V2 + c6(t)qV ,
and the optimal trading strategy in feedback form is
ν∗(t , q , V) = c2(t) – γc3(t) + (b + 2c4(t) – γc6(t))q + (c6(t) – 2γc5(t))V
2k
.
Proof. This is shown by direct substitution into (2.1).
Proposition 2.2. If µ = 0 then c2 = c3 ≡ 0.
Proof. This is immediate from equations (2.2) and (2.3).
Proposition 2.2 is a result of symmetry in the model when the unaffected market value of the asset is
a martingale. In this circumstance, the agent’s value function remains unchanged if the underlying state
variables are transformed according to (q , S, V) 7→ (–q , –S, –V). In addition, we also see ν∗(t , –q , –V) =
–ν∗(t , q , V). This is an expected result because if the dynamics possess enough symmetry, then the agent
should place equal value on a long position in the asset as they would on a short position of equal magnitude,
as long as his future projection of the total value of his current holdings is the same.
2.4 Numerical Experiments
Of particular interest is how the trading strategy depends on the values of Qt and Vt . The effect of these
underlying processes on the trading strategy can be directly quantified by the corresponding loadings. To
this end, observe that ν∗ can be written as
ν∗(t , q , V) = c2(t) – γc3(t)
2k
+ ν∗q (t)q + ν∗V(t)V ,
where ν∗q and ν∗V are defined by
ν∗q (t) =
b + 2c4(t) – γc6(t)
2k
, ν∗V(t) =
c6(t) – 2bc5(t)
2k
.
In Figure 1 we plot the loadings on Qt and Vt for the optimal trading strategy ν∗. The behaviour we
see in the left panel is typical of this type of model for optimal execution. In particular, the loading on
Qt is seen to grow to a large negative value as t → T. This is because of the agent’s terminal risk control
represented by αQ2T and the relevance of this term becomes stronger as time approaches the horizon of
the trading period. Although the loading shown above is typical, we will see below that the contribution
of inventory towards trading speed, and indeed the total trading speed, exhibits behaviour which is not
typically seen in this style of optimal execution.
There is also an intuitive explanation for why the loading on Vt is most significant close to time T, and
it is because Vt is more likely to experience a change in sign if there is a longer time to the horizon of the
trading period. If the agent is overeager in his attempts to extract profits early in the trading period due
to exploiting the trade signal Vt , then he risks this quantity changing sign in which case his prior trades
are in fact working against his goals. If this occurs then the agent would wish to reverse his trades, but the
round trip involved in this task accumulates needless costs due to temporary price impact. By waiting until
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Figure 1: Optimal loadings on Qt and Vt . Parameters used are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 0.1,
ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, and T = 1.
a time closer to T, the probability and magnitude of this type of sign change is significantly lowered, thus
the agent prefers to wait before extracting profits.
In Figure 2 we show simulated paths of the optimal trading strategy broken down into the two main
contributing components, as well as the total trading speed. The left panel shows the graph of ν∗q (t)Qν
∗
t ,
the center panel shows ν∗V(t)V
ν∗
t , and the last shows ν
∗(t , Qν∗t , Vν
∗
t ). Here we see what may be considered
atypical behaviour in an optimal execution program. Namely that all of the individual contributions to the
trading speed, as well as the total trading speed, are concentrated towards the end of the trading period.
In other optimal execution models, for example Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Cartea et al. (2018), the
loading on Qt becomes large as t approaches T, but the magnitude of the contribution to the trading speed
from inventory does not change significantly over the course of the trading period. The main contributing
factor to this difference is related to the discussion of the previous paragraph. The agent’s main source of
profits is due to the value of the trade signal Vt , but this is only taken advantage of through trades that
are submitted when the sign of Vt is the same as the sign of VT. This gives incentive for the agent to delay
trades and perform most of his action at times close to T.
3 Multiple Agents
3.1 Model with Interaction
Here we consider a model in which multiple agents trade with interaction. The interaction stems from
the fact that price impact will account for the trading of all agents, not just an individual. Agents are
indexed by n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and each agent has his own control process νn = (νnt )0≤t≤T. As before the
control process represents the rate of trading for agent n , thus the inventory holdings of agent n denoted
by Qn ,ν
n
= (Qn ,ν
n
t )0≤t≤T changes according to
dQn ,ν
n
t = ν
n
t dt , Q
n ,νn
0 = Q
n
0 ,
6
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Figure 2: Contribution to trading speed of Qt and Vt , and total optimal trading speed νt . Parameters used
are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 0.1, ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, T = 1, S0 = 100, V0 = 0,
and Q0 = 0.
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where we assume each Qn0 is independent from all other variables with finite expectation and variance. The
market view of the asset value is denoted Sν¯ = (Sν¯t )0≤t≤T and changes according to
dSν¯t = (µ+ bν¯t )dt + σdWt , S
ν¯
0 = S0 , (3.1)
where ν¯t is the average trading rate of all agents at time t
ν¯t :=
1
N
N∑
n=1
νnt .
Temporary price impact incurred by agent n depends only on his own rate of trading such that the transaction
price for agent n is
Ŝ
νn ,ν¯
t = S
ν¯
t + kν
n
t .
Thus, the cash process of agent n , denoted Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯ = (Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t )0≤t≤T changes according to
dXn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t = –Ŝ
νn ,ν¯
t ν
n
t dt , X
n ,νn ,ν¯
0 = X
n
0 .
Lastly, it will be useful to define the average inventory holdings of all agents Q¯ν¯ = (Q¯ν¯t )0≤t≤T which is given
by
Q¯ν¯t :=
1
N
N∑
n=1
Qn ,ν
n
t . (3.2)
It appears from the definition that Q¯ν¯ depends on each individual νn , but given Q¯0 we have
dQ¯ν¯t =
1
N
N∑
n=1
dQn ,ν
n
t
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
νnt dt
= ν¯tdt ,
which justifies the dependence on only ν¯. We remark here that based on the definition of Q¯ν¯t in (3.2), if we
assume in addition that all Qn0 are independent and identically distributed then when we directly handle the
limiting case N→∞ we have Q¯ν¯0 = E[Qn ,ν
n
0 ]. From now on we will make this assumption on the collection
(Qn0 )n∈N.
3.2 Shared Subjective View of Asset Value
First we consider a model in which each agent receives the same trade signal. The common trade signal is
denoted by V¯ν¯ = (V¯ν¯t )0≤t≤T and changes according to
dV¯ν¯t = –(βV¯
ν¯
t + γ¯ν¯t )dt + ηdZt , V¯
ν¯
0 = V¯0 ,
8
where Z = (Zt )0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion correlated with W with constant correlation parameter ρ. The
N agents under consideration do not represent all participants in the market, only the ones which are acting
based on the trade signal V¯ν¯ . This is why there is a prevailing market price Sν¯ which is different from the
valuation due to the trade signal of Sν¯ + V¯ν¯ . Each agent attempts to maximize his own expected future
wealth given that the trading strategies of all other agents are fixed. We let ν–n denote the collection of
trading strategies for all agents except agent n . Then for a fixed ν–n , agent n wishes to maximize the
functional
J(νn ; ν–n ) = E
(
Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯
T +Q
n ,νn
T (S
ν¯
T + V¯
ν¯
T) – α(Q
n ,νn
T )
2
)
.
Throughout Section 3.2 we work with a complete and filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft )0≤t≤T,P) where
(Ft )0≤t≤T is the standard augmentation of the natural filtration generated by (Wt , Zt )0≤t≤T and the
initial state (S0, (Qn0 )n∈N, (Xn0 )n∈N, V¯0).
3.2.1 HJB Equation and Consistency Condition
We do not attempt to solve the finite player game, rather we consider the limiting case N → ∞ directly.
Under this condition the average trading speed ν¯ is not affected by any one individual control νn . Thus,
fixing ν–n is equivalent to fixing ν¯. In addition, we assume ν¯t = ν¯(t , Q¯
ν¯
t , V¯
ν¯
t ) so that we remain within a
Markovian framework. With a fixed function ν¯ we may define the value function for agent n as
Hn (t , x , q , q¯ , S, V¯; ν¯) := sup
νn∈N
Et ,x ,q ,q¯ ,S,V¯
(
Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯
T +Q
n ,νn
T (S
ν¯
T + V¯
ν¯
T) – α(Q
n ,νn
T )
2
)
, (3.3)
where the collection of admissible strategies N consists of F-predicable processes such that E[∫ T0 (νnt )2 dt ] <
∞.
The value function in (3.3) has an associated HJB equation of the form
∂tHn + sup
νn∈R
(Aν
n ,ν¯Hn ) = 0, Hn (T, x , q , q¯ , S, V¯; ν¯) = x + qV¯ – αq2, (3.4)
where the operator Aν
n ,ν¯ is given by
Aν
n ,ν¯ = –(S + kνn )νn∂x + νn∂q + ν¯∂q¯ + (µ+ bν¯)∂S – (βV¯ + γ¯ν¯)∂V¯ +
1
2
σ2∂SS +
1
2
η2∂V¯V¯ + ρση∂SV¯ .
Based on the form of the feedback control in the previous section, we make the further assumption
ν¯(t , q¯ , S, V¯) = f1(t) + f2(t)q¯ + f3(t)V¯ . (3.5)
With this assumption the solution to the HJB equation (3.4) along with the optimal control in feedback
form can be characterized by a solution to a system of ODE’s.
Proposition 3.1. Given ν¯ in (3.5), suppose c1, . . . , c10 : [0, T] → R satisfy the following system of
ODEs with terminal conditions:
c ′1 + f1(c3 – γ¯c4) + η2c7 +
c22
4k
= 0 , c1(T) = 0 , (3.6)
9
c ′2 + µ+ f1(b + c8 – γ¯c9) +
c2c5
k
= 0 , c2(T) = 0 ,
c ′3 + f1(2c6 – γ¯c10) + f2(c3 – γ¯c4) +
c2c8
2k
= 0 , c3(T) = 0 ,
c ′4 + f1(c10 – 2γ¯c7) + f3(c3 – γ¯c4) – βc4 +
c2c9
2k
= 0 , c4(T) = 0 ,
c ′5 +
c25
k
= 0 , c5(T) = –α ,
c ′6 + f2(2c6 – γ¯c10) +
c28
4k
= 0 , c6(T) = 0 ,
c ′7 + f3(c10 – 2γ¯c7) – 2βc7 +
c29
4k
= 0 , c7(T) = 0 ,
c ′8 + f2(b + c8 – γ¯c9) +
c5c8
k
= 0 , c8(T) = 0 ,
c ′9 + f3(b + c8 – γ¯c9) – βc9 +
c5c9
k
= 0 , c9(T) = 1 ,
c ′10 + f2(c10 – 2γ¯c7) + f3(2c6 – γ¯c10) – βc10 +
c8c9
2k
= 0 , c10(T) = 0 , (3.7)
Then the value function Hn is given by
Hn (t , x , q , q¯ , S, V¯) = x + qS + hn (t , q , q¯ , V¯) ,
hn (t , q , q¯ , V¯) = c1(t) + c2(t)q + c3(t)q¯ + c4(t)V¯
+ c5(t)q2 + c6(t)q¯2 + c7(t)V¯
2 + c8(t)qq¯ + c9(t)qV¯ + c10(t)q¯V¯ ,
and the optimal trading strategy in feedback form is
νn∗(t , q , q¯ , V) = c2(t)
2k
+
c5(t)
k
q +
c8(t)
2k
q¯ +
c9(t)
2k
V¯ . (3.8)
Proof. This is shown by direct substitution into (3.4).
In order for the trading strategy in (3.8) to yield a mean-field Nash equilibrium it is necessary that a
consistency condition is satisfied. Because (3.8) is based on the assumption that the average trading speed
is given by (3.5), we must impose that when each agent uses the strategy (3.8) the resulting average trading
speed is (3.5). Thus, we require
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
νn∗(t , qn , q¯ , V¯) = ν¯(t , q¯ , V¯) .
Substituting (3.5) and (3.8) into this equation yields
f1 =
c2
2k
, f2 =
2c5 + c8
2k
, f3 =
c9
2k
. (3.9)
When solving equations (3.6) to (3.7) we shall always substitute (3.9) first to guarantee that the optimal
strategy in (3.8) represents an equilibrium. In a mean-field Nash equilibrium, the optimal strategy of agent
n can be written in a particular form demonstrated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2. In equilibrium, the trading strategy of agent n and the average trading rate of all
agents are related by
νn∗(t , qn , q¯ , V¯) = c5(t)
k
(qn – q¯) + ν¯(t , q¯ , V¯) .
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Proof. This is a consequence of combining equations (3.5), (3.8), and (3.9).
Proposition 3.3. If α = 0 then c3 = c5 = c6 = c8 = c10 ≡ 0 in equilibrium. If µ = 0 then c2 = c3 =
c4 ≡ 0 in equilibrium. If α = µ = 0 then the non-zero ci in equilibrium are given by
c1(t) = η2
∫ T
t
c29(s)
4b
(1 – e–
b
k (T–s))ds ,
c7(t) =
c29(t)
4b
(1 – e–
b
k (T–t)) ,
c9(t) =
2kβ – b
(γ¯ + 2kβ – b)e
2kβ–b
2k (T–t) – γ¯
,
and the optimal strategy in feedback form is
νn∗(t , qn , q¯ , V¯) = c9(t)
2k
V¯ =
1
2k
(
2kβ – b
(γ¯ + 2kβ – b)e
2kβ–b
2k (T–t) – γ¯
)
V¯ .
Proof. In equations (3.6) to (3.7) we substitute (3.9). The result can then be seen by direct substitution.
3.2.2 Numerical Experiments
In a similar fashion to Section 2.4 we are interested in the loadings of the optimal strategy on the underlying
processes and the resulting pathwise behaviour. By substituting equations (3.9) into equations (3.6) to (3.7)
we arrive at a system of ODE’s which define a mean-field Nash equilibrium, and this system easily lends
itself to numerical methods. From (3.8) we have
νn∗(t , q , q¯ , V¯) = c2(t)
2k
+ ν∗q (t)q + ν∗¯q q¯ + ν∗¯V(t)V¯ ,
where we have defined
ν∗q (t) =
c5(t)
k
, ν∗¯q =
c8(t)
2k
ν∗¯V(t) =
c9(t)
2k
.
We plot the functions ν∗q , ν∗¯q and ν∗¯V in Figure 3. We see that ν
∗
q and ν∗¯V have qualitatively similar behaviour
in the multi-agent setting as when there is an individual agent, and the reasoning is the same.
The additional loading ν∗¯q is seen to change sign about half way through the trading period, and shortly
after reaching its maximum positive value it quickly drops to zero. The behaviour of this loading can be
explained by considering the actions of the entire population of agents combined with the resulting dynamics
of the midprice and trade signal, and the results are more easily understood by seeing the effect that the
price impact and trade signal impact parameters, b and γ¯, have on this loading.
In Figure 4 we show the loading ν∗¯q as a function of time for several values of the parameters b and γ¯. In
the left panel, the parameter γ¯ is fixed and each curve represents a different value of b. As b is increased,
the loading decreases, and the sensitivity is greatest at earlier times. The direction and magnitude of these
changes as well as the sign of the loading are understood by considering what the population will do on
average based on the average inventory of the population and based on the time remaining in the trading
period. If the average inventory is high, then the agent expects the order flow to be negative. This will have
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Figure 3: Optimal loadings on Qt , Q¯t , and Vt . Parameters used are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1, γ¯ = 0.1,
ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, and T = 1.
two effects on quantities relevant to the agent. First, it will decrease the price of the asset in the future,
and second, it will increase the value of the trade signal to the agent. When the remaining time is short,
this increase in the value of the trade signal gives incentive to buy shares of the asset to benefit from this
perceived increase in subjective value. However, the impact on the trade signal is short lived due to the
mean-reverting dynamics, so when the remaining time is long this incentive to buy shares does not arise
because it will have disappeared before the advantage can be gained. For longer remaining times the effect
of permanent price impact dominates, and the price decrease caused by negative order flow incentivizes the
agent to sell shares. A larger value of price impact b makes the decision to trade based on price impact
dominate the decision to trade on a change in the trade signal, hence the loading ν∗¯q (t) decreases with b.
The fact that the sensitivity to b is greatest at time t = 0 is also explained due to the permanent nature of
order flow on price impact along with the transient nature of the effect on the trade signal.
In the right panel, the parameter b is fixed and each curve represents a different value of γ¯. As γ¯ is
increased, the loading increases, and this effect is most pronounced close to the end of the trading period.
The reasoning for the general shape of each curve is the same as in the discussion of the left panel in the
previous paragraph. Also based on the same discussion is the reason that the sensitivity towards γ¯ is greatest
close to the end of the trading period. This comes from the transient nature of the impact effects on the
trade signal, so when the remaining time is large the agent knows these effects will gradually disappear
before they can offer their advantage.
In Figure 5 we show the result of a simulation when each agent acts according to the mean-field optimal
strategy described by the loadings plotted in Figure 3. The most striking feature of this simulation is that
all agents appear to approach very similar terminal inventory holdings even though the initial positions are
wide spread. This stems from the fact that they each share the same view of the asset’s value. At time
T, there will be a tradeoff to holding non-zero inventory between the terminal liquidation penalty and the
additional value imparted by the signal V¯T. Since each agent assigns the same value to this signal, they are
willing to accept the same magnitude of terminal penalty in order to benefit from the signal.
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Figure 4: Optimal loading on Q¯t . Left panel: γ¯ = 0.1 and b ranging from 0 (blue curve) to 5 · 10–2 (red
curve). Right panel: b = 10–2 and γ¯ ranging from 0 (blue curve) to 0.5 (red curve). Other parameters are
µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1, ρ = 0.3, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, and T = 1.
Indeed, if we consider the optimal trading strategy for an arbitrary agent, from (3.8) it satisfies
νn∗t =
c2(t) + 2c5(t)Q
n ,νn∗
t + c8(t)Q¯
ν¯
t + c9(t)V¯
ν¯
t
2k
.
This can be rewritten, and recalling that this represents the optimal rate of inventory change we write
dQn ,ν
n∗
t =
c2(t)
2k
dt +
c8(t)Q¯
ν¯
t
2k
dt –
c5(t)
k
(
c9(t)
–2c5(t)
V¯ν¯t – Q
n ,νn∗
t
)
dt .
As t → T, the first two terms above approach zero. We also have c5(T) = –α and c9(T) = 1. Thus, towards
the end of the trading interval we expect Qn ,ν
n∗
to drift towards V¯
ν¯
t
2α . For the simulated path corresponding
to Figure 5, this value is equal to –0.58 and the average of the terminal inventories is –0.53.
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Figure 5: The top row shows the contributions to trading speed from Qt , Q¯t , and V¯t . The left panel of the
second row shows each agent’s inventory path Qn ,ν
n
t (blue curves) as well as the average inventory of all
agents Q¯ν¯t (red dotted curve). The right panel of the second row shows the optimal trading speed νit (blue
curves) and the average trading speed ν¯t (red dotted curve). Parameters used are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5,
β = 1, γ¯ = 0.1, ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, T = 1, S0 = 100, V¯0 = 0, Qn0 ∼ N (0, 0.52), and
N = 50.
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3.3 Separate Subjective View of Asset Value
Here we consider a model in which each agent has his own individual trading signal, each of which changes ac-
cording to a different stochastic process. For agent n we denote his trading signal by Vn ,ν
n ,ν¯ = (Vn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t )0≤t≤T
which changes according to
dVn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t = –(βV
n ,νn ,ν¯
t + γν
n
t + γ¯ν¯t )dt + ηdZ
n
t , V
n ,νn ,ν¯
0 = V
n
0 ,
Znt = ρWt +
√
1 – ρ2Wn ,⊥t ,
where each Wn ,⊥ = (Wn ,⊥t )0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion, independent of one another for different n , and
independent of W. In addition we assume that all Vn0 are i.i.d. with finite expectation and variance, and
independent from all other variables. Inventory and price dynamics are equivalent to those of Section 3.1.
In this section it will be useful to consider the average value of the trading signals over all agents which will
be denoted V¯ν¯ = (V¯ν¯t )0≤t≤T and is defined by
V¯ν¯t :=
1
N
N∑
n=1
Vn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t .
Based on this definition we may also compute the dynamics to be
dV¯ν¯t =
1
N
N∑
n=1
dVn ,ν
n ,ν¯
t
= –(βV¯ν¯t + (γ + γ¯)ν¯t )dt +
η
N
N∑
n=1
dZnt
= –(βV¯ν¯t + (γ + γ¯)ν¯t )dt + ηρdWt +
η
√
1 – ρ2
N
N∑
n=1
dWn ,⊥t .
Due to the independence of each Wn ,⊥, when we consider the limit N → ∞ the last term above becomes
zero due to the law of large numbers. It is worth making the brief remark that this model of separate trade
signals can be reduced to the shared signal of Section 3.2 by choosing some parameter values in a particular
way. Specifically, if each Vn0 in 3.3 and V0 of 3.2 are equal to a constant (the same constant for each n),
and if γ = 0 and ρ = ±1 (in both models), then we have Vn ,νn ,ν¯t = V¯
ν¯
t and every agent observes the same
trade signal, which is the setting considered in Section 3.2.
Each agent attempts to maximize his own expected future wealth given that the trading strategies of all
other agents are fixed. That is, if ν–n is fixed, agent n wishes to maximize the functional
J(νn ; ν–n ) = E
(
Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯
T +Q
n ,νn
T (S
ν¯
T +V
n ,νn ,ν¯
T ) – α(Q
n ,νn
T )
2
)
.
For the remainder of Section 3.3 we work with a complete and filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft )0≤t≤T,P)
where (Ft )0≤t≤T is the standard augmentation of the natural filtration generated by (Wt , Znt )0≤t≤T,n∈N
and the initial state (S0, (Qn0 )n∈N, (Xn0 )n∈N, (Vn0 )n∈N).
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3.3.1 HJB Equation and Consistency Condition with Separate Subjective Views
With a similar approach to Section 3.2.1 we consider a solution in the limiting case N → ∞. We assume
that the average trading speed is of the form ν¯t = ν¯(t , Q¯
ν¯
t , V¯
ν¯
t ) to remain within a Markovian framework.
This is similar to the assumption that was made in Section 3.2.1 except we must use V¯ν¯t because all agents
have a different subjective view. With this function fixed we define the value function for agent n as
Hn (t , x , q , q¯ , S, V, V¯; ν¯) := sup
νn∈N
Et ,x ,q ,q¯ ,S,V,V¯
(
Xn ,ν
n ,ν¯
T +Q
n ,νn
T (S
ν¯
T +V
n ,νn ,ν¯
T ) – α(Q
n ,νn
T )
2
)
, (3.10)
where the set of admissible strategies N consists of all F-predictable processes such that E[∫ T0 (νnt )2 dt ] <∞.
The value function in (3.10) has an associated HJB equation of the form
∂tHn + sup
νn∈R
(Aν
n ,ν¯Hn ) = 0, Hn (T, x , q , q¯ , S, V, V¯; ν¯) = x + q(S + V) – αq2, (3.11)
where the operator Aν
n ,ν¯ is given by
Aν
n ,ν¯ = –(S + kνn )νn∂x + νn∂q + ν¯∂q¯ + (µ+ bν¯)∂S – (βV + γνn + γ¯ν¯)∂V – (βV¯ + (γ + γ¯)ν¯)∂V¯
+
1
2
σ2∂SS +
1
2
η2∂VV +
1
2
ρ2η2∂V¯V¯ + ρση∂SV + ρση∂SV¯ + ρ
2η2∂VV¯ .
Based on the form of the feedback control in the previous sections, we make the further assumption
ν¯(t , q¯ , V¯) = f1(t) + f2(t)q¯ + f3(t)V¯ . (3.12)
With this assumption the solution to the HJB equation (3.11) along with the optimal control in feedback
form can be characterized by a solution to a system of ODE’s.
Proposition 3.4. Given ν¯ in (3.12), suppose c1, . . . , c15 : [0, T] → R satisfy the following system of
ODEs with terminal conditions:
c ′1 + f1(c3 – γ¯c4 – (γ + γ¯)c5) + η2c8 + ρ2η2(c9 + c15) +
(c2 – γc4)2
4k
= 0 , c1(T) = 0 ,
(3.13)
c ′2 + µ+ f1(b + c10 – γ¯c11 – (γ + γ¯)c12) +
(2c6 – γc11)(c2 – γc4)
2k
= 0 , c2(T) = 0 ,
c ′3 + f1(2c7 – γ¯c13 – (γ + γ¯)c14) + f2(c3 – γ¯c4 – (γ + γ¯)c5) +
(c2 – γc4)(c10 – γc13)
2k
= 0 , c3(T) = 0 ,
c ′4 – βc4 + f1(c13 – 2γ¯c8 – (γ + γ¯)c15) +
(c2 – γc4)(c11 – 2γc8)
2k
= 0 , c4(T) = 0 ,
c ′5 – βc5 + f1(c14 – γ¯c15 – 2(γ + γ¯)c9) + f3(c3 – γ¯c4 – (γ + γ¯)c5) +
(c2 – γc4)(c12 – γc15)
2k
= 0 , c5(T) = 0 ,
16
c ′6 +
(2c6 – γc11)2
4k
= 0 , c6(T) = –α ,
c ′7 + f2(2c7 – γ¯c13 – (γ + γ¯)c14) +
(c10 – γc13)2
4k
= 0 , c7(T) = 0 ,
c ′8 – 2βc8 +
(c11 – 2γc8)2
4k
= 0 , c8(T) = 0 ,
c ′9 – 2βc9 + f3(c14 – γ¯c15 – 2(γ + γ¯)c9) +
(c12 – γc15)2
4k
= 0 , c9(T) = 0 ,
c ′10 + f2(b + c10 – γ¯c11 – (γ + γ¯)c12) +
(2c6 – γc11)(c10 – γc13)
2k
= 0 , c10(T) = 0 ,
c ′11 – βc11 +
(2c6 – γc11)(c11 – 2γc8)
2k
= 0 , c11(T) = 1 ,
c ′12 – βc12 + f3(b + c10 – γ¯c11 – (γ + γ¯)c12) +
(2c6 – γc11)(c12 – γc15)
2k
= 0 , c12(T) = 0 ,
c ′13 – βc13 + f2(c13 – 2γ¯c8 – (γ + γ¯)c15) +
(c11 – 2γc8)(c10 – γc13)
2k
= 0 , c13(T) = 0 ,
c ′14 – βc14 + f2(c14 – γ¯c15 – 2(γ + γ¯)c9) + f3(2c7 – γ¯c13 – (γ + γ¯)c14) +
(c10 – γc13)(c12 – γc15)
2k
= 0 , c14(T) = 0 ,
c ′15 – 2βc15 + f3(c13 – 2γ¯c8 – (γ + γ¯)c15) +
(c11 – 2γc8)(c12 – γc15)
2k
= 0 , c15(T) = 0 .
(3.14)
Then the value function Hn is given by
Hn (t , x , q , q¯ , S, V, V¯) = x + qS + hn (t , q , q¯ , V, V¯) ,
hn (t , q , q¯ , V, V¯) = c1(t) + c2(t)q + c3(t)q¯ + c4(t)V + c5(t)V¯ + c6(t)q2 + c7(t)q¯2 + c8(t)V2
+ c9(t)V¯
2 + c10(t)qq¯ + c11(t)qV + c12(t)qV¯ + c13(t)q¯V + c14(t)q¯V¯ + c15(t)VV¯ ,
and the optimal trading strategy in feedback form is
νn∗(t , q , q¯ , V, V¯) = c2(t) – γc4(t)
2k
+
2c6(t) – γc11(t)
2k
q +
c10(t) – γc13(t)
2k
q¯ +
c11(t) – 2γc8(t)
2k
V +
c12 – γc15(t)
2k
V¯ .
(3.15)
Proof. This is shown by direct substitution into equation (3.11).
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In a similar fashion to the previous section, we require a consistency condition to be satisfied in order
for the trading strategy in (3.15) to yield a mean-field Nash equilibrium. The strategy (3.15) is based on
the assumption that the average trading speed is given by (3.12), therefore we must impose that when each
agent uses the strategy (3.15) the resulting average trading speed is (3.12). Thus, we require
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
νn∗(t , qn , q¯ , Vn , V¯) = ν¯(t , q¯ , V¯) .
Substituting (3.5) and (3.8) into this equation yields
f1 =
c2 – γc4
2k
, f2 =
2c6 + c10 – γ(c11 + c13)
2k
, f3 =
c11 + c12 – γ(2c8 + c15)
2k
. (3.16)
As we did in the previous section, we will only consider solutions of (3.13) to (3.14) in which (3.16) has been
enforced. This means we only consider optimal trading strategies that result in equilibrium. Also as in the
previous section, the trading strategies in a mean-field Nash equilibrium can be written in a particular form
Proposition 3.5. In equilibrium, the trading strategy of agent n and the average trading rate of all
agents are related by
νn∗(t , qn , q¯ , Vn , V¯) = 2c6(t) – γc11(t)
k
(qn – q¯) +
c11(t) – 2γc8(t)
2k
(Vn – V¯) + ν¯(t , q¯ , V¯)
Proposition 3.6. If α = γ = 0 then c3 = c6 = c7 = c10 = c13 = c14 ≡ 0 in equilibrium. If µ = 0 then
c2 = c3 = c4 = c5 ≡ 0 in equilibrium. If α = γ = µ = 0 then the non-zero ci in equilibrium are given
by
c1(t) =
∫ T
t
η2c8(s) + ρ2η2(c9(s) + c15(s))ds ,
c8(t) =
T – t
4k
e–2β(T–t) ,
c9(t) = –
4z 2e–
b
k (T–t)
1 – (1 + 2z )eω(T–t)
D9(t) ,
c11(t) = e–β(T–t) ,
c12(t) =
–2z
1 – (1 + 2z )eω(T–t)
– e–β(T–t) ,
c15(t) = –
(T – t)
2k
e–2β(T–t) –
(
2z
1 – (1 + 2z )eω(T–t)
)(
1 – e–
b
2k (T–t)
b
)
e–β(T–t) ,
where
D9(t) =
1
16kz 2
(
1 – e–2ωτ
2ω
– τe–2ωτ
)
–
1 + 2z
8kz 2
(
1 – e–ωτ
ω
– τe–ωτ
)
+
2z γ¯ – b
4bz (kβ – b)
(
1 – e(
b
k –β)τ
)
+
1
4b
(
1 – e
b
k τ
)
–
1 + 2z
2bz
(
1 – e
b
2k τ
)
–
1
32kz 2ω
(
1 – e–2ωτ
)
+
(1 + 2z )b – 4z 2γ¯
8bkz 2ω
(
1 – e–ωτ
)
–
(1 + 2z )2
16kz 2
τ ,
z =
2kβ – b
2γ¯
,
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ω =
2kβ – b
2k
,
τ = T – t .
Proof. In equations (3.13) to (3.14) we substitute (3.16). The first two conclusions can be seen by inspec-
tion. The expressions for the non-zero ci come from a tedious computation, but can be checked by direct
substitution.
3.3.2 Numerical Experiments
We consider again the loadings of the optimal strategy on the underlying processes. Note that from (3.15)
we have
νn∗(t , q , q¯ , V, V¯) = c2(t) – γc4(t)
2k
+ ν∗q (t)q + ν∗¯q (t)q¯ + ν∗V(t)V + ν
∗¯
V(t)V¯ ,
where the loadings on q , q¯ , V and V¯ are given by
ν∗q (t) =
2c6(t) – γc11(t)
2k
, ν∗¯q (t) =
c10(t) – γc13(t)
2k
,
ν∗V(t) =
c11(t) – 2γc8(t)
2k
, ν∗¯V(t) =
c12(t) – γc15(t)
2k
.
We plot the above four loadings in Figure 6. The first three loadings are qualitatively similar to the
situation where each agent’s subjective valuation is governed by the same process, but the intuition behind
understanding these loadings is more effectively shown by considering various values of some of the relevant
parameters.
In Figure 7 we show the loadings on Q¯t and V¯t as the three impact parameters b, γ, and γ¯ are varied.
Many of the features shown in this figure can be explained with similar reasoning to the discussion around
Figure 4. New features which deserve discussion are the qualitative shape of the loading ν∗¯V and the ordering
of the curves based on the changing parameter.
Typically the loading ν∗¯V has a minimum value, usually negative, shortly before the end of the trading
period. If the average signal viewed by agents is positive shortly before time T, then this will tend to increase
the average order flow and the agent can expect their own trade signal to decrease, thus giving them reason
to sell the asset. However, there is a counteracting effect which is the impact that the average order flow
has on the asset price. When the average order flow is positive the asset price will tend to increase, giving
incentive for the agent to buy shares shortly before time T. This explains why larger values of permanent
price impact, b, result in higher loading ν∗¯V (bottom left panel) and why larger values of market impact on
trade signal, γ¯, result in lower loading ν∗¯V.
The permanence of price impact and the transience of trade signal impact also explain the sharp humps
seen in this figure. Since any impact on the trade signal will decay over time due to mean reversion, the
considerations of market wide order flow on trade signals become more significant shortly before T. The
effects of market wide order flow on the price are long lasting, so the agent takes into account this effect
over the entire trading period.
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Figure 6: Optimal loadings on Qt , Q¯t , Vt , and V¯t . Parameters used are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1,
γ = 0.05, γ¯ = 0.1, ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, and T = 1.
In Figure 8 we show a simulation of relevant processes when each agent adopts the mean-field optimal
strategy depicted in Figure 6. The main qualitative difference between this simulation and that shown in
Figure 5 is that the distribution of terminal inventories (QnT)n≤N does not become concentrated around
a particular value based on the average trade signal. In fact, in this particular simulation the terminal
inventories have sample variance 1.32 which is significantly greater than the initial sample variance of 0.24
(the initial inventories are drawn from a distribution with variance 0.52 = 0.25).
4 Cross-Sectional Distribution of Inventories and Signals
In this section we compute the joint distribution of the agents’ inventories and signals when all agents use
the mean-field equilibrium strategy given by (3.15) (with (3.16) enforced). We do not directly consider the
case when all agents observe the same trade signal because those corresponding results can be obtained from
those of the separate signal by setting ρ = 1, γ = 0, and each Vn0 the same constant. In addition, as we are
assuming all agents are using the mean-field equilibrium strategies, we drop the notational dependencies on
νn and ν¯.
We begin by defining the processes Yn = (Ynt )0≤t≤T and Y¯ = (Y¯t )0≤t≤T by
Ynt =
[
Qnt
Vnt
]
, Y¯t =
[
Q¯t
V¯t
]
.
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Figure 7: Top row shows optimal loading on Q¯t for various parameters, bottom row shows optimal loading
on V¯t . Each figure considers a change in only one parameter, indicated in the legend, from a minimum value
(blue curve) to a maximum value (red curve). Otherwise the fixed parameters are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5,
β = 1, γ = 0.05, γ¯ = 0.1, ρ = 0.3, b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, and T = 1.
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Figure 8: The top row shows the contributions to trading speed from Qt , Q¯t , and Vt . The left panel of
the second row shows the contributions from V¯t . The middle panel of the second row shows each agent’s
inventory path Qn ,ν
n
t (blue curves) as well as the average inventory of all agents Q¯
ν¯
t (red dotted curve). The
right panel of the second row shows the optimal trading speed νnt (blue curves) and the average trading
speed ν¯t (red dotted curve). Parameters used are µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 0.05, γ¯ = 0.1, ρ = 0.3,
b = 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, T = 1, S0 = 100, Vn0 ∼ N (0, 0.022), Qn0 ∼ N (0, 0.52), and N = 50.
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We also introduce random measure processes on R2, denoted mN = (mNt )0≤t≤T and m = (mt )0≤t≤T,
which are given by
mNt =
1
N
N∑
n=1
δYnt , mt = limN→∞
mNt .
In the next proposition we provide expressions for the mean vector Y¯t and covariance matrix Σ¯t of the
distribution induced by m .
Proposition 4.1. Let at , Bt , and Ct be given by
at =
c2(t) – γc4(t)
2k
[
1
–(γ + γ¯)
]
,
Bt =
[
ν∗q (t) ν∗V(t)
–γν∗q (t) –(β + γν∗V(t))
]
,
Ct =
 ν∗q (t) + ν∗¯q (t) ν∗V(t) + ν∗¯V(t)
–(γ + γ¯)(ν∗q (t) + ν∗¯q (t)) –
(
β + (γ + γ¯)(ν∗V(t) + ν
∗¯
V(t))
)  ,
and let Φt and Ψt be the solutions to the matrix differential equations
Φ′t = Ct Φt , Φ0 = I2×2 , (4.1)
Ψ′t = Bt Ψt , Ψ0 = I2×2 . (4.2)
The mean vector and covariance matrix induced by mt are given by
Y¯t = Φt
(
Y¯0 +
∫ t
0
Φ–1u au du + ρ
∫ t
0
Φ–1u ΘdWu
)
, (4.3)
Σ¯t = Ψt Σ¯0Ψ>t + (1 – ρ2)Ψt
∫ t
0
Ψ–1u ΘΘ>(Ψ–1u )>duΨ>t , (4.4)
where
Θ =
[
0
η
]
.
If the distribution induced by m0 is Gaussian, then mt induces a Gaussian distribution for all t ∈ [0, T].
If µ = α = γ = 0 then the covariance matrix in (4.4) has individual elements
Σ¯Qt = Σ¯
Q
0 +
e–βT
k
t Σ¯QV0 +
e–2βT
4 k2
t2 Σ¯V0 + (1 – ρ2)
η2 e–2βT
16β3 k2
(e2βt – 1 – 2β t – 2β2 t2) , (4.5)
Σ¯Vt = 2–2βt Σ¯V0 + (1 – ρ2)
η2
2β
(1 – e–2βt ) , (4.6)
Σ¯QVt = e
–βt Σ¯QV0 +
e–βT
2 k
t e–βt Σ¯V0 + (1 – ρ2)
η2 e–βT
4β2 k
(sinh(βt) – β t e–βt ) . (4.7)
Proof. The dynamics of Yn and Y¯ are given by
dYnt = (at +Bt Y
n
t + (Ct – Bt ) Y¯t ) dt + ΘdZnt , (4.8)
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dY¯t = (at +Ct Y¯t ) dt + ρΘdWt . (4.9)
The solution to (4.9) is given by (4.3) (see Section 5.6 of Karatzas and Shreve (2012)). By substituting this
solution for Y¯t into (4.8) and performing some tedious computations we arrive at
Ynt = Ψt (Yn0 – Y¯0) + Φt Y¯0 + Φt
∫ t
0
Φ–1u au du + ρΦt
∫ t
0
Φ–1u ΘdWu +
√
1 – ρ2 Ψt
∫ t
0
Ψ–1u ΘdW
n ,⊥
u .
Subtracting Y¯t from this expression yields
Ynt – Y¯t = Ψt (Yn0 – Y¯0) +
√
1 – ρ2Ψt
∫ t
0
Ψ–1u ΘdW
n ,⊥
u ,
from which we also compute
(Ynt – Y¯t )(Y
n
t – Y¯t )
> = Ψt (Yn0 – Y¯0) (Yn0 – Y¯0)>Ψ>t + 2
√
1 – ρ2 Ψt (Yn0 – Y¯0)
∫ t
0
Ψ–1t ΘdW
n ,⊥
u
+ (1 – ρ2)Ψt
(∫ t
0
Ψ–1t ΘdW
n ,⊥
u
)(∫ t
0
Ψ–1t ΘdW
n ,⊥
u
)>
Ψ>t .
We sum both sides over 1 ≤ n ≤ N and divide by N. As N → ∞ the left hand side converges to Σ¯t . The
second term on the right converges to zero due to independence of Yn0 and W
n ,⊥. Applying the law of large
numbers and Ito’s isometry to the third term yields (4.4). If the initial distribution of m0 is Gaussian, then
independence of Yn0 and W
n ,⊥ and the fact that the stochastic integrand is deterministic result in mt being
Gaussian.
To obtain the expression in (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7) we first use Proposition 3.6 to write the matrix Bt in
closed form. Then (4.2) can be solved in closed form, which yields
Ψt =
[
1 e
–βT
2 k t
0 e–βt
]
, Ψ–1t =
[
1 – e
–β(T–t)
2 k t
0 eβt
]
.
Substituting these expressions into (4.4) and computing the integral gives the result.
The covariance matrix in (4.4) confirms an observation made in comparing the simulations of Figure 5
and Figure 8: the sample variance of the terminal inventory of all agents is greater when they have separate
signals compared to when they share the same signal. This is because of the lower correlation between
signals implied by the separate signals and the term 1 – ρ2 in (4.4). In fact the variance of inventory will be
minimized when the correlation is ρ = ±1. This has a clear intuitive reason being that if the agents have
very similar signals then they will trade in a similar fashion, and any variance in their terminal inventory will
be the result of variance of their initial inventory and the limited speed of trading due to market frictions
such as temporary price impact.
In Figure 9 we show the variances and correlation across agents of inventories and signals in the mean-
field limit. This gives a visual demonstration that the variance of inventories is lowest when ρ2 is largest.
In addition we also see that in the early parts of the trading period the variance does not depend much on
the magnitude of shared information which is measured by ρ2. This is due to the fact that for much of the
trading interval the agents are controlling the size of their inventory by trading towards a common target of
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Figure 9: Cross sectional variances and correlation of Qnt and V
n
t in mean-field limit. Parameters used are
µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.05, γ¯ = 0.1, b = 5 ·10–2, k = 5 ·10–3, α = 0.1, T = 1. The initial variances
of inventories and signals are 0.52 and 0.022 respectively with an initial correlation of 0.
zero. When the end of the trading period is closer they begin to take advantage of the information in the
trade signal, and their trading targets due to the trade signal may be different causing their inventories to
diverge.
The behaviour of the trade signal variance is more expected. Since the initial distribution is relatively
concentrated with a variance of 0.022, the variance quickly increases, but at different rates depending on
the magnitude of shared information measured by ρ2. If ρ2 is large then the agents share much of the same
information, and so it is expected that the cross sectional variance of their trade signals is lower.
With the expression given in (4.3) for the cross sectional mean of inventory and signal, we are able to
demonstrate the effect of a shared trade signal on the variance of the asset price. This is done in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.2. In mean-field equilibrium, the variance of the asset price is
E[(St – E[St ])2] =
∫ t
0
(
ρ η b
[
1 0
]
Φt Φ–1u
[
0
1
]
+ σ
)2
du , (4.10)
where Φt is as in Proposition 4.1. If µ = α = γ = 0 then this reduces to
E[(St – E[St ])2] =
∫ t
0
(
2 ρ η z (e–
b
2k (t–u) – 1)
1 – (1 + 2 z ) eω(T–u)
+ σ
)2
du , (4.11)
where
ω =
2kβ – b
2k
, z =
2kβ – b
2γ¯
.
Proof. With ν¯t in (3.1) being set equal to the average trading speed in equilibrium we may write
dSt =
(
µ+
c2(t) – γc4(t)
2k
+Nt Y¯t
)
dt + σ dWt ,
where
Nt = b
[
ν∗q (t) + ν∗¯q (t) , ν∗V(t) + ν
∗¯
V(t)
]
.
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With the expression for Y¯t given in (4.3) the solution to the SDE can be written as
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
(
µ+
c2(t) – γc4(u)
2k
+Nu Φu Y¯0 +Nu Φu
∫ u
0
Φ–1s as ds
)
du
+
∫ t
0
(
ρ η b
[
1 0
]
Φt Φ–1u
[
0
1
]
+ σ
)
dWu ,
where as is defined as in Proposition 4.1. This allows us to write
St – E[St ] =
∫ t
0
(
ρ η b
[
1 0
]
Φt Φ–1u
[
0
1
]
+ σ
)
dWu ,
and the result in (4.10) follows from Ito’s isometry. The expression in (4.11) arises again from using Propo-
sition 3.6 to solve (4.1), which yields
Φt =
 1 2 z (e–
b
2k t–1)
b(1–(1+2 z )eωT)
0 1–(1+2 z ) e
ω(T–t)
1–(1+2 z ) eωT e
– b2k t
 , Φ–1t =
 1 –2 z (e–
b
2k t–1) e
b
2k t
b (1–(1+2 z ) eω(T–t))
0 1–(1+2 z ) e
ωT
1–(1+2 z ) eω(T–t)
e
b
2k t
 .
Substituting these expressions into (4.10) yields (4.11).
In Figure 10 we plot the variance of St through time when agents trade according to the mean-field
equilibrium strategy. If there were no price impact then this variance would be purely from the accumulated
volatility over time. With price impact, the drift of the midprice has an element of randomness caused by the
common noise component of the agents’ trade signal. Here we see that the effect on price variance depends
on more than just the information shared by agents, as measured by ρ2, but the sign of ρ also matters.
When ρ2 is large, agents share a lot of information and trade in a similar fashion. When this happens with
positive ρ, their order flow is concentrated and tends to occur in the same direction as midprice changes,
effectively increasing the size of midprice changes and therefore variance. When ρ is negative, their order
flow is concentrated but tends to occur in the opposite direction of midprice changes, lowering the variance.
When ρ is close to zero, they share little information and net order flow tends to be close to zero which adds
no additional variance to the midprice.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model for price dynamics and trading in which an agent attempts to extract
profits from his own subjective valuation of an asset. When his subjective view of asset value is significantly
different than the traded market price he wants to accumulate a large position, but friction effects and risk
aversion prevent him from trading too quickly. Instead he manages a trade-off between the potential profits
and costs. We continue our analysis when multiple agents are undertaking this task, either with a common
trade signal shared between them or with individual signals correlated to each other. A mean-field game
approach is taken to represent a setting with a large number of agents which keeps the problem tractable.
This also allows us to study the cross sectional distribution of inventory as it depends on the correlation
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Figure 10: Variances of midprice St through time in mean-field limit for various ρ. Parameters used are
µ = 0, σ = 1, η = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.05, γ¯ = 0.1, b = 5 · 10–2, k = 5 · 10–3, α = 0.1, T = 1.
structure of the collection of signals. When correlation between signals is large, the inventory across all
agents will have a tighter distribution because they are essentially trading off of the same information and
therefore have similar behaviour. The correlation between signal and price innovations also modifies the
asset price variance, as the random order flow will cause it to deviate from its accumulated volatility over
time. Positive correlation between each signal and price innovations will increase the variance of the asset
price at any fixed point in time.
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